Chapter 18 — Connected and Exposed
43 references
| # | Reference | Links | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Figure 18.1 — Andy Greenberg's highway demonstration for Wired. The researchers controlled the Jeep from ten miles away wired.com | Source Archive | 🟢 Archived |
| 2 | ISO/SAE 21434 iso.org | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 3 | IoT Security Requirements Generator tangibles-book.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 4 | IoT Security Scorecard tangibles-book.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 5 | ETSI EN 303 645 etsi.org | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 6 | EU Cyber Resilience Act digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu | Source Archive | 🟢 Archived |
| 7 | UK PSTI gov.uk | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 8 | IEC 62443-4-2 webstore.iec.ch | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 9 | EU NIS2 eur-lex.europa.eu | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 10 | FDA premarket cybersecurity guidance fda.gov | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 11 | IEC 81001-5-1 webstore.iec.ch | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 12 | IEC 60601 webstore.iec.ch | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 13 | Figure 18.4 — Screenshot of a prison facility from security footage provided by APT-69420 bloomberg.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 14 | GDPR eur-lex.europa.eu | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 15 | ISO 27001 iso.org | Source Archive | 🟢 Archived |
| 16 | tangibles-book.com tangibles-book.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 17 | STRIDE learn.microsoft.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 18 | Figure 18.7 — Ring doorbell camera. Millions installed; no mandatory two-factor authentication at the time of the attacks commons.wikimedia.org | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 19 | Security and Privacy in Your Car Act (SPY Car Act), S.1806, introduced by Senators Markey and Blumenthal markey.senate.gov | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 20 | Stephen Cobb, "Cybersecurity, manufacturing, and the costly Chrysler Jeep hack," WeLiveSecurity welivesecurity.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 21 | US Cyber Trust Mark and FDA premarket cybersecurity guidance. FCC Cyber Trust Mark fcc.gov | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 22 | Kudelski Group keySTREAM kudelskilabs.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 23 | Tesla BLE relay attacks documented from 2016 through 2024. See: The Guardian, September 2016; Auto Evolution, May 2024; The Byte / Futurism, November 2024 | ⚪ Print source | |
| 24 | "Hackers release source code for a powerful DDoS app called Mirai," techcrunch.com | Source Archive | 🟢 Archived |
| 25 | Stephanie Wash, "Ring security camera hacks see homeowners subjected to racial abuse, ransom demands," abcnews.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 26 | Marat Fudim et al., "Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of Cardiac Implantable Electronic Devices," Circulation, American Heart Association Journals, November 2018. See also: FDA Safety Communication on firmware update for Abbott (formerly St. Jude Medical) implantable cardiac pacemakers, August 2017… securityweek.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 27 | BrickerBot permanently disabled over 2 million IoT devices in 2017 by exploiting default Telnet credentials. See: Wikipedia, "BrickerBot." | ⚪ Print source | |
| 28 | Apple iPhone security update commitment: MacRumors, "Apple Commits to at Least Five Years of iPhone Security Updates," June 2024 (UK PSTI-triggered disclosure). Google Pixel 8+ commits to 7 years OS + security updates (Google Support, December 2024). Samsung Galaxy S24+ commits to 7 years (Samsung… | ⚪ Print source | |
| 29 | Bitsight TRACE, "40K Security Cameras Found Compromised Online" bitsight.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 30 | CISA, NSA, and FBI, "PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to US Critical Infrastructure" cisa.gov | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 31 | 2FA implementation cost estimates: Authgear, "How Much Does Two-Factor Authentication Cost?" (2026); Messente, "2FA Implementation Costs." In-house build using TOTP (e.g., speakeasy for Node.js, pyotp for Python) requires 5–10 weeks of developer time. Managed alternatives: Duo Essentials at… | ⚪ Print source | |
| 32 | IBM Security / Ponemon Institute, "Cost of a Data Breach Report 2024." Global average: $4.88 million. Healthcare sector average: $7–10 million. IoT devices cited as a growing attack vector, with an estimated 820,000 attacks per day on connected devices | ⚪ Print source | |
| 33 | xz backdoor (CVE-2024-3094). Inserted into the widely used xz compression utility through a multi-year social-engineering campaign by an apparent state actor using the pseudonym "Jia Tan." It was discovered in March 2024 by Andres Freund of Microsoft before it reached stable releases of Debian… | ⚪ Print source | |
| 34 | Oldsmar water treatment attack. In February 2021, an unidentified attacker accessed the Oldsmar, Florida, water treatment plant through a dormant TeamViewer account and attempted to raise sodium hydroxide concentration from 100 ppm to 11,100 ppm. A plant operator noticed the unauthorized cursor… | ⚪ Print source | |
| 35 | Medtronic MiniMed insulin pump vulnerability. FDA Safety Communication, "Certain Medtronic MiniMed Insulin Pumps Have Potential Cybersecurity Risks," June 27, 2019. Affected models: MiniMed 508 and Paradigm series. Approximately 4,000 patients in the United States were notified and offered… | ⚪ Print source | |
| 36 | SBOM operational burden. For a practical overview of SBOM automation challenges – generation vs. ongoing maintenance – see: Kiuwan, "SBOM Automation" kiuwan.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 37 | CAN bus gateway. CAN bus gateway modules are now standard in automotive E/E architectures. NXP's MPC5748G Gateway Reference Design Board is a representative development platform for such components. See: NXP MPC5748G-GW-RDB nxp.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 38 | STRIDE. Microsoft, "The STRIDE Threat Model," originally developed by Loren Kohnfelder and Praerit Garg in 1999. STRIDE categorizes threats as Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege. Referenced in ETSI EN 303 645 Annex A as an… | ⚪ Print source | |
| 39 | Verkada FTC enforcement. FTC, "FTC Takes Action Against Security Camera Firm Verkada" ftc.gov | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 40 | Norsk Hydro ransomware. Microsoft, "Hackers hit Norsk Hydro with ransomware. The company responded with transparency" news.microsoft.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 41 | JBS Foods ransomware. "JBS paid $11 million in ransom after hackers shut down meat plants" washingtonpost.com | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 42 | OFAC ransomware sanctions guidance. US Treasury OFAC, "Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments" ofac.treasury.gov | Source | 🟡 No archive |
| 43 | iPhone Visa NFC theft. Mezha Media, "Visa vulnerability allows you to steal money from a locked iPhone" mezha.ua | Source | 🟡 No archive |
IoT Attack Surface Reference
The comprehensive IoT-adapted OSI taxonomy referenced in Chapter 18. Each layer maps to documented attack vectors and real-world case studies. Use this as a checklist when conducting security reviews — verify that your threat model covers every layer, not just the application surface.
For security professionals: This reference complements the IoT Security Scorecard, which maps its 19 assessment questions to both ETSI EN 303 645 provisions and OSI layers. Run the scorecard to identify gaps, then return here for the full attack taxonomy at each layer.
Layer 1 Physical
Vigilante malware exploited open Telnet ports with default credentials to permanently brick over 2 million IoT devices. Target: same attack surface as Mirai, opposite intent — destroy rather than conscript.
Wikipedia →Direct hardware access enables credential extraction via JTAG/UART debug interfaces, firmware dumping from flash chips, and side-channel attacks (power analysis, electromagnetic probing) against cryptographic implementations.
Differential power analysis (DPA) and electromagnetic side-channel attacks can extract private keys from hardware without breaking the cryptographic algorithm directly. Relevant for medical implants, payment terminals, and access control hardware.
Layer 2 Data Link
Researchers amplified the BLE signal from an owner's phone or key fob to extend its effective range, unlocking and starting vehicles without breaking encryption. Variants persisted through multiple Tesla security updates. In 2024, attackers demonstrated credential theft via fake charging station Wi-Fi portals.
Guardian (2016) → Futurism (2024) →The Tapplock fingerprint padlock could be opened by anyone with a Bluetooth sniffer and ten minutes of patience — the device transmitted its MAC address and derived the unlock code from it. Multiple BLE-enabled smart locks shipped with unauthenticated pairing protocols or unencrypted command channels.
The Verge →On networks using MAC-based access controls, an attacker who captures a valid device's MAC address can impersonate it. Demonstrated on coffee shop and enterprise Wi-Fi networks; also relevant for BLE peripherals that use static MAC addresses.
Stack Exchange →Layer 3 Network
State-sponsored malware infected over 500,000 home and small-office routers across 54 countries. Unlike typical botnets, VPNFilter could survive a reboot, intercept traffic, and was pre-positioned for destructive payload deployment — a template for the Volt Typhoon infrastructure pre-positioning campaigns that followed.
Hacker News →Layer 4 Transport
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), designed for low-power IoT devices, was abused for DDoS amplification — a small request triggers a large response from thousands of devices, multiplying attack bandwidth. IoT protocols designed for constrained environments frequently omit authentication and rate-limiting.
Daily Swig →Layer 5 Session
Tools that captured unencrypted session cookies on open Wi-Fi networks, demonstrating that session management failures allow account takeover without credential theft. Relevant for IoT devices that maintain persistent sessions with cloud services over unencrypted channels.
Layer 6 Presentation
Oversized or malformed packets crash vulnerable network stacks. IoT devices running minimal embedded TCP/IP implementations (often unpatched) are particularly susceptible. Relevant for OT/SCADA systems running legacy protocol stacks.
Layer 7 Application
Unencrypted RF communication and absent firmware authentication in implanted cardiac devices. An attacker within wireless range could, in theory, drain the battery, alter pacing commands, or deliver inappropriate shocks. ~465,000 devices required a risky in-clinic firmware update.
AHA Journals →A cellular modem sat on the same CAN bus as the vehicle's steering, braking, and transmission controls with no firewall between them. Researchers took full remote control of a moving vehicle from ten miles away. Triggered the first-ever NHTSA recall for a cybersecurity vulnerability (1.4 million vehicles).
Wired →Scanned for devices running Telnet with factory-default credentials (62 username/password pairs). Conscripted 600,000+ devices into a botnet capable of 620 Gbps DDoS attacks. Took down DNS provider Dyn, disrupting Twitter, Netflix, Reddit, and Spotify. Source code was released publicly, spawning dozens of variants.
TechCrunch →Credential stuffing attacks — trying username/password pairs from unrelated data breaches — against Ring accounts with no mandatory second factor. Attackers spoke to families through cameras installed in children's bedrooms. Root cause: a product decision to ship without mandatory 2FA to reduce onboarding friction.
ABC News →A hacker accessed a family's Nest thermostat and camera, cranking the temperature to 90°F and speaking through the camera for 24 hours. Same credential-stuffing vector as Ring. Google's response placed the security burden on users rather than the product.
Trend Micro →Hackers remotely accessed SCADA systems at Texas water treatment plants. In Muleshoe, a water storage tank overflowed for 30–45 minutes before manual control was restored. American Water — the largest US water utility, serving 14 states — disclosed unauthorized system access in October 2024.
CNBC →